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Abstract 
This review discusses food safety aspects of importance from a One Health perspective, focusing on Europe. Using 
examples of food pathogen/food commodity combinations, spread of antimicrobial resistance in the food web and 
the risk of transmission of zoonotic pathogens in a circular system, it demonstrates how different perspectives are 
interconnected. The chosen examples all show the complexity of the food system and the necessity of using a One 
Health approach. Food safety resources should be allocated where they contribute most One Health benefits. Data 
on occurrence and disease burden and knowledge of source attribution are crucial in assessing costs and benefits 
of control measures. Future achievements in food safety, public health and welfare will largely be based on how well 
politicians, researchers, industry, national agencies and other stakeholders manage to collaborate using the One 
Health approach. It can be concluded that closer cooperation between different disciplines is necessary to avoid silo 
thinking when addressing important food safety challenges. The importance of this is often mentioned, but more 
proof of concept is needed by the research community.
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Background
Achievements in food safety, public health and welfare in 
coming decades will be based on successful One Health 
(formerly One Medicine) endeavours. One Health is a 
holistic or big-picture approach where the tenet is that 
welfare and wellbeing is based on human, animal and 
environmental health and that integration and sharing 
of information on animal and human health is the key to 
efficient health systems [1, 2]. One Health represents a 
rapidly growing range of synergistic disciplines, including 
food safety, public health, health economics, ecosystem 
health, social science and animal health, for addressing 
complex health problems [3]. Several zoonoses of public 
health importance in Europe are foodborne [4], but food-
borne pathogens may also be non-zoonotic. What they 
have in common is that a One Health approach is needed 
to manage food safety and to understand the drivers 
and determinants for the emergence and persistence of 
human, animal and environmental threats.
Food safety resources should be allocated where 
they contribute most to One Health benefits. With-
out knowledge of, e.g. the incidence and burden of 
disease associated with particular pathogen/food com-
modity combinations, prioritisation of foodborne haz-
ards against which mitigation measures should be put 
into force is difficult. Data on occurrence and disease 
burden are therefore crucial in assessing both benefits 
and costs of control measures. Moreover, there are chal-
lenges in prioritising among different public health risks 
when setting healthcare goals and supporting food safety 
and public health risk management by measuring burden 
of disease and source attribution [5–7].
Technical knowledge about pathogen transmission 
paths is important when designing control strategies 
against foodborne diseases but, for these methods to be 
efficient, consumer behaviour, food trends, economic 
incentives, trade and politics need to be taken into 
account [8]. Thus successful One Health policies build 
upon understanding the socio-economic contexts of 
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farmers, food business operators and consumers. Moreo-
ver, a One Health approach is needed in efforts to reduce 
the amount of food waste and increase utilisation of 
nutrients, e.g. by using closed circular food systems [9].
This review examines food safety aspects of importance 
from a One Health perspective, focusing on Europe. 
A few examples are used to illustrate this and to depict 
the complexity of food webs. The examples also provide 
important lessons on future challenges and demonstrate 
the value and helpfulness of a One Health approach cov-
ering the entire food web.
Search strategy
This literature review was provided through searches of 
PubMed (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed), Google 
Scholar (https://scholar.google.com),  Scopus® (https://
www.scopus.com) and Web of Science (https://apps.
webofknowledge.com) using the key words and other 
terms relevant for this review (e.g. source attribution, 
DALY, QALY, cost-of-illness, community incidence), 
followed by evaluation of the bibliographies of relevant 
articles. Selection of the included papers were done 
stepwise. Initially the article titles from the literature 
searchers were assessed and if they were expected to be 
relevant for the paper the abstracts were read in the next 
step. If the abstracts were deemed relevant the full paper 
were retrieved and read. Web sites of relevant organiza-
tions and authorities (e.g. WHO, EFSA) were also used 
to retrieve information. Literature search was carried out 
between June and October 2017.
Occurrence of zoonotic diseases and foodborne 
outbreaks within the EU
All member states within the European Union (EU) 
are obliged to collect data on occurrence of zoonoses, 
zoonotic agents, antimicrobial resistance, animal popu-
lations and foodborne outbreaks, according to Directive 
2003/99/EC. These reports enable evaluation of trends 
and sources of zoonotic agents, antimicrobial resistance 
and foodborne outbreaks within the EU [4]. However, 
the data must be interpreted with caution because sur-
veillance, monitoring and reporting are not harmonised 
within the EU, which contributes to substantial, but vari-
able, underreporting.
Campylobacter spp. continues to be the most com-
monly reported zoonotic disease within the EU, fol-
lowed by Salmonella [4, 10]. Similarly, according to the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) diarrhoeal disease 
agents contributed 49–68% of the total burden of food-
borne disease in 2015, with non-typhoidal S. enterica 
and Campylobacter spp. being the most important bac-
terial pathogens [11]. It should also be noted that the 
human cases of zoonoses reported by the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA) only include zoonotic infections, 
and that data on the occurrence, sources and trends of 
other foodborne diseases are not included, such as dis-
eases caused by Cryptosporidium hominis, norovirus and 
Clostridium perfringens. For example, Adak et al. [12] list 
C. perfringens as one of the most important foodborne 
pathogens, together with Campylobacter spp., Salmo-
nella, Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) 
O157 and Listeria monocytogenes. In 2010–11, around 
27,000 cases were estimated to be part of a waterborne 
outbreak caused by the parasite C. hominis in Sweden 
[13], which shows the public health importance of this 
pathogen.
Information based on foodborne outbreaks reported 
to the EFSA should be interpreted with caution, as out-
break investigation systems are not harmonised within 
the EU [4]. However, it appears that bacterial agents, 
particularly Salmonella and Campylobacter spp., caused 
most of the reported outbreaks with a known source in 
2014 and 2015 [4, 10]. In addition, bacterial toxins (other 
than those produced by Clostridium botulinum) and cali-
civiruses, including norovirus, were common causes of 
reported outbreaks in those years. Norovirus caused the 
highest number of cases related to foodborne outbreaks 
amongst the total number reported [4].
Community incidence of foodborne 
gastrointestinal infections within the EU
Reliable data on foodborne community disease inci-
dences are important in assessing the impact of infec-
tions on health, setting priorities for development of 
control strategies and monitoring progress [12, 14]. How-
ever, reported data are mainly based on passive surveil-
lance, which underestimates the true incidence. This, 
combined with underreporting and under-diagnosis, fur-
ther impairs the reliability of reported incidences. More-
over, the rates of underreporting and under-diagnosis 
vary between infectious agents and between countries, 
for reasons such as differences in surveillance routines, 
pathogens investigated, differences in healthcare systems 
and healthcare use, and laboratory practices [15].
A few cohort studies have investigated the extent of 
underreporting and under-diagnosis and have produced 
multipliers for estimating the true number of cases for 
every case reported in national surveillance of diseases 
caused by foodborne gastrointestinal pathogens. This 
enables better comparisons between nationally reported 
incidences. For example, the multiplier for campylobac-
teriosis and salmonellosis in the EU, based on data from 
Swedish travellers, was 47 and 58, respectively. The high-
est multiplier for campylobacteriosis was reported for 
Bulgaria (40,000 for each reported case) and for salmo-
nellosis for Portugal (2080 for each reported case) [16]. 
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However, there were large uncertainties in the dataset 
analysed in previous cohort studies. Moreover, changes 
to healthcare and reporting systems may change the mul-
tiplier. Studies in the United Kingdom showed that the 
multiplier increased from 3.2 to 4.7 for Salmonella and 
from 7.6 to 9.3 for Campylobacter spp. between 1999 
and 2012 [17, 18]. Possible explanations include reduced 
general practitioner (GP) consultations due to changes in 
primary care and introduction of telephone advice ser-
vices [18].
As cohort studies are time-consuming and complicated 
to perform, other studies have calculated community 
incidence of gastroenteritis by reconstructing surveil-
lance pyramids to estimate different measures of disease 
at different levels in the surveillance system [14, 15]. It 
has also been reported that the country-specific mul-
tipliers for different EU countries vary between 9.3 and 
100 for Campylobacter spp. and between 6.7 and 50 for 
Salmonella [15]. Thus, the reported number of cases, or 
reported incidence, only constitutes a fraction of the true 
incidence.
Disease surveillance priorities also vary between dif-
ferent countries within the EU. For example, toxoplas-
mosis is not considered a top priority in many countries 
due to the low number of reported cases. However, in the 
Netherlands, Toxoplasma gondii is mentioned as one of 
two pathogens (the other being Campylobacter spp.) for 
which specific prevalence targets in foodstuffs should be 
implemented [16].
Contribution of various food sources to foodborne 
disease
Source attribution or pathogen account is an important 
tool for quantifying the contribution of various food 
sources to foodborne disease, thereby supporting food 
safety and public health management and intervention 
strategies [5, 19]. For food safety policy, it is important 
also to know the fraction that is attributable to sources 
other than food, for example environmental exposure, 
direct animal contact and human-to-human contact [20].
Control strategies for the major reservoirs will prevent 
subsequent human exposure, regardless of the transmis-
sion route or vehicle. However, the reservoirs or major 
sources of human foodborne illness may change over 
time. For example, at the end of the 1980s, broiler meat 
was the attributed major source of human salmonellosis 
in Denmark, but during the 1990s this changed to pork 
and later to table eggs [21]. In 1999, 47% of salmonellosis 
cases in Denmark were attributed to table eggs [5]. Since 
then, there have been EU baseline studies on Salmonella 
in laying hens, followed by implementation of EU-wide 
control programmes for Salmonella in laying hen systems 
(Commission Regulation (EU) No. 517/2011), resulting 
in a substantial reduction in Salmonella in laying hens 
[4]. This control programme has resulted in an approxi-
mately 50% reduction in the risk of Swedish travellers in 
the EU contracting salmonellosis [22] and there has also 
been a substantial reduction in reported human cases of 
salmonellosis [4]. There has been convergence amongst 
all EU Member States to the level of control achieved by 
Sweden and Finland, which implemented control pro-
grammes against Salmonella in food-producing animals 
as early as the 1960s [23, 24].
In the Netherlands, about two-thirds of the food-
borne disease burden has been reported to be attribut-
able to foodborne infections of animal origin, followed 
by human-to-human transmission and environmental 
transmission [16]. Similarly, Adak et  al. [12] found that 
between 63 and 99% of STEC O157, Campylobacter spp., 
L. monocytogenes and non-typhoidal Salmonella cases 
were foodborne. The relatively high burden of environ-
mental transmission was mainly attributable to T. gondii.
Impact measurements of foodborne disease
Public health burdens of disease can be measured in sev-
eral complementary ways, for example by using disabil-
ity adjusted life years (DALY), quality adjusted life years 
(QALY) and cost-of-illness. Both DALY and cost-of-ill-
ness enable more comprehensive comparisons of infec-
tious pathogens with different patterns of incidence and 
outcome, and show relatively little difference in ranking 
of pathogens [6, 7]. This can help policymakers allocate 
appropriate resources for food safety control and inter-
vention efforts.
A recent report from the WHO investigating the bur-
den of foodborne diseases showed that the DALY per 
100,000 population for three European regions, together 
covering the whole of Europe, ranged from 24 to 28 for 
diarrhoeal agents to 10–19 for invasive infectious disease 
agents, 0.4–6 for helminths and 0.9–2 for chemicals and 
toxins [11].
In a study on disease burden in the Netherlands, the 
highest incidences were estimated for norovirus, rota-
virus and bacterial toxins (Staphylococcus aureus, C. 
perfringens) [16]. However, on a yearly level the dis-
ease burden using DALY was highest for congenital 
T. gondii (23 DALY/100,000 population), followed by 
Campylobacter spp. (20 DALY/100,000 population), 
Rotavirus (11 DALY/100,000 population) and norovi-
rus (9 DALY/100,000 population) [6, 16]. Norovirus and 
Campylobacter spp. were associated with the highest cost 
on a population level [6].
Cost-of-illness from a societal perspective includes 
the costs related to the healthcare sector (direct 
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costs), resources used by patients and their families 
and non-healthcare-related resources (indirect costs) 
used, e.g. productivity losses due to absence from 
work, permanent or long-term disability or prema-
ture mortality [6]. The indirect costs are often much 
higher than the direct healthcare costs [7]. This was 
shown, e.g. in a Salmonella outbreak in the Nether-
lands in 2012, where the productivity losses were the 
main cost driver [25]. Variations in cost inventory 
methods make it difficult to interpret and compare 
costs across multiple studies and it has been sug-
gested that a more standardised cost inventory would 
simplify the analysis [26].
From an economic perspective, it can be considered 
whether overall resources are used more efficiently by 
integrated, One Health surveillance than by a surveil-
lance system with disconnected, sector-specific com-
ponents. The lack of evidence detailing the costs and 
benefits to the different sectors of such collaborative 
efforts is one of the main hurdles to the wider adoption 
of One Health holistic approaches [27]. In one rare study, 
Martins et al. [28] reported increased costs using an inte-
grated One Health system, although there were other 
intangible benefits.
On a population level, the highest costs are often 
reported for the most common foodborne infection, e.g. 
for campylobacteriosis [29]. However, the cost per case 
is often higher for diseases with relatively low burden 
and total societal costs, e.g. infection with Campylobac-
ter spp. and STEC O157 due to sequelae such as reactive 
arthritis (RA), irritable bowel syndrome (IBS), Guillain–
Barré syndrome (GB) and haemolytic uraemic syndrome 
(HUS) [29, 30].
Health-related benefits are generally more difficult to 
value than costs, so policymakers to date have largely 
relied on cost-effectiveness analysis to guide health poli-
cies [31]. Health effects are often quantified using QALY 
and interventions are evaluated by the cost per expected 
QALY gained, which is sometimes referred to as cost util-
ity analysis [32]. By using DALY the disease burden to the 
society can be measured, and policymakers can then set 
the right priorities, while QALY is helpful for assessing 
benefits of interventions, selecting those that give most 
QALY for the money available [33].
The costs of controlling foodborne diseases in food-
producing animals are high and some studies have 
investigated the effect that a relaxation of the Swed-
ish Salmonella control programme in food-producing 
animals would have on public health and societal costs 
[34, 35]. They concluded that the number of reported 
domestic salmonellosis cases would increase sub-
stantially and the net cost effects would therefore be 
negative.
Cases illustrating One Health and food safety 
in Europe
The cases presented below provide more detailed insights 
into relevant sources and drivers from a One Health per-
spective (Fig. 1) and how these interact. Key aspects that 
are discussed in relation to the presented cases are illus-
trated in Fig.  2. To improve future food safety systems 
and increase the ability to respond to new and unknown 
food safety threats, we need to learn from the history. 
The chosen examples all show the complexity of the food 
system and the necessity of using a One Health approach.
Pathogen/food commodity combinations and One 
Health challenges
Norovirus‑contaminated raspberries
The number of notifications for norovirus within the EU 
increased from 1998 to 2013 [36] and norovirus is cur-
rently the pathogen causing the highest number of cases 
of foodborne outbreaks within the EU. Although norovi-
rus is not a zoonotic agent, it has still a strong One Health 
element, being food and waterborne and also transmitted 
from person to person.
In the EU, reported norovirus outbreaks have mainly 
been caused by contaminated vegetables, fruits, cereals, 
sprouts, herbs and spices [4]. Among these products, 
Fig. 1 The key elements included in One Health
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non-heat-treated raspberries are a common source of 
outbreaks, as reported, e.g. in Norway [37], France [38], 
Sweden [39, 40], Denmark [41] and Finland [42]. One 
driver for this is the growing trend for eating healthy and 
minimally processed food, including increased consump-
tion of, e.g. smoothies and yoghurts based on fruit or 
berries [43].
Raspberries receive little or no processing prior to con-
sumption and there is thus no pathogen inactivation step 
before consumption [44]. This, together with liberalisa-
tion of markets, has facilitated distribution of raspberries 
that may be contaminated by norovirus [44]. Between 
1988 and 2005, there was a 4.5-fold increase in volume of 
berries consumed within the EU [43]. From the late 1980s 
to the 2000s, there was also a 2.5-fold increase in imports 
of soft frozen fruits into the EU for processing [44].
Due to long survival of norovirus and low reduction in 
infectivity during storage, it is difficult to reduce the risk 
of norovirus infection from consuming berries. Freez-
ing reduces the viability of the virus by less than one log 
or 90% [45], which is not enough to eliminate the risk of 
infection. For example, outbreak data have shown that 
raspberries which have been frozen for months can be 
the vehicle for norovirus outbreaks [40]. Processing rou-
tines, such as mixing batches from different origins dur-
ing freezing and before packaging for frozen berries, may 
lead to large-scale cross-contamination and consequently 
disease outbreaks [36]. Tracing contaminated batches of 
raspberries following outbreaks has revealed complex 
distribution systems. For example, one batch of frozen 
raspberries may originate from more than 60 different 
farms, in many cases small-scale producers [41, 42]. This 
makes it difficult to detect the farm(s) that was the point 
of introduction of the agent.
It is seldom known if norovirus contamination 
occurred at processing, freezing, packing or during pri-
mary production, as there are knowledge gaps on the 
risk factors for norovirus-contaminated berries [46–48]. 
However, it has been suggested that viral contamination 
most likely takes place at the production step, more spe-
cifically during irrigation with contaminated water or 
during collection by food handlers’ hands, particularly 
if there are insufficiencies regarding hygiene conditions 
during picking, e.g. lack of toilets and hand-washing 
facilities [44, 46]. Raspberries consumed fresh are usu-
ally manually harvested due to the fragility of the plant 
and the berry [44]. The importance of norovirus contam-
ination by hand contact has been confirmed in a farm-
to-fork risk assessment model and a human norovirus 
exposure assessment [47–49].
The use of sewage-contaminated water should be 
avoided at all stages of the supply chain [44] and an EU 
regulation states that only water which does not con-
tain micro-organisms or other harmful substances in 
quantities capable of affecting the health quality of food 
should be used during production of berries (EC Regula-
tion 852/2004). This is challenging, as norovirus can be 
present in surface water [50]. Presence of norovirus can 
be correlated with faecal indicators such as E. coli [51], 
which emphasises the risk of contamination of irrigation 
water sources by sewage and effluents [44].
There is no regular monitoring of berries for the pres-
ence of norovirus in most EU member states and there 
are limited prevalence data on norovirus contamination 
Fig. 2 Key aspects related to the included cases illustrating food safety and One Health
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of berries in the published literature. In addition, quan-
titative data on viral load are scarce. It is therefore not 
possible to provide a risk base for establishing a pro-
cess hygiene criterion and food safety criterion for these 
foods, which has been proposed for other foods such as 
oysters [52]. Good agricultural practices (GAP), good 
hygiene practices (GHP) and good manufacturing prac-
tices (GMP) are the primary objective of operators pro-
ducing berries [44].
Shiga toxin‑producing Escherichia coli in sprouts
STEC infections are the fourth most commonly reported 
zoonosis in the EU. While serogroup O157 continues 
to be the most commonly reported (42% in 2015), there 
appears to be an increasing trend in other serogroups and 
non-typable STEC strains. This is partly due to increased 
awareness of other serogroups and better diagnostic 
methods [4]. Cattle are the main recognised STEC reser-
voirs and bovine meat is considered to be a major source 
of foodborne STEC infections in humans [53]. However, 
in recent years some of the major outbreaks caused by 
STEC within the EU have been attributed to vegetables 
[54, 55]. Despite this, only a small fraction of fruit and 
vegetable samples and sprouted seed samples have been 
found to test positive for STEC in the EU [4].
In 2011, a unique E. coli strain (STEC O104:H4), which 
had not previously been considered to be of public health 
importance, was reported in Northern Germany [56]. 
This was the start of one of the largest STEC outbreaks 
ever and was followed by a similar outbreak in France in 
the same year [57]. The STEC O104:H4 strain differed in 
several ways from previously described STEC strains, e.g. 
with a much higher fraction of cases developing HUS and 
severe neurological symptoms [56]. In total, this outbreak 
caused more than 3800 cases of illness and more than 
50 deaths [58] and involved several EU countries [59]. 
The causative organism was an enteroaggregative E. coli 
(EAEC) that had acquired the ability to produce Shiga 
toxin via horizontal gene transfer. The result was a strain 
with enhanced adherence factor that may have facilitated 
the absorption of Shiga-toxin, resulting in the severity of 
symptoms found in patients in this outbreak [60]. The 
strain had not been described in animals and only rarely 
in humans, suggesting a human reservoir, whereas typical 
STEC strains are zoonotic [61].
Initial epidemiological studies indicated fresh salad 
vegetables as the probable vehicle of infection [59]. In 
an early stage, Spanish cucumbers were declared as 
being the source of the outbreak [62], but this was incor-
rect and based on preliminary test results. This mistake 
resulted in economic losses amounting to over 800 mil-
lion Euro for horticulture producers in several EU coun-
tries, as their products were withdrawn from the market 
[63]. Ultimately, organic fenugreek sprouts from seeds 
imported from Egypt were identified as the highly likely 
cause of the outbreak [62]. It is speculated that asympto-
matic workers may have been the cause of seed contami-
nation [64].
During the outbreak, appropriate risk and crisis man-
agement was delayed, as it was not possible to conduct 
a risk assessment. This was caused by the challenges in 
identifying the causative agent due to lack of methods 
available for the detection of STEC strain O104:H4 in the 
beginning of the outbreak [62]. The fact that sprouted 
seeds are usually an inconspicuous ingredient, and often 
feature as a garnish, may also have prolonged the inves-
tigation to determine the implicated source [64]. The 
outbreak caused economic and reputational damage not 
only to vegetable producers, but also to retailers and gov-
ernment authorities [65]. When the outbreak was over, 
several promotion activities were launched in order to 
win back consumer trust in fruit and vegetables [66].
Sprouted seeds have been identified as high-risk foods 
for STEC and Salmonella and the majority of outbreaks 
caused by sprouted seeds have been associated with 
these pathogens [67]. The largest reported outbreak asso-
ciated with sprouted seeds, with over 10,000 notified 
cases, occurred in Japan in 1996 and was attributed to 
consumption of radish sprouts contaminated with STEC 
O157:H7 [68]. Contamination of dry seeds with bacterial 
pathogens is the most likely initial source of the outbreaks 
associated with sprouted seeds, although other routes of 
contamination (e.g. during production due to poor prac-
tices) may also occur [69]. The most relevant risk factors 
for dry seed contamination are associated with the effect 
of agricultural practices on seed production, storage and 
distribution, e.g. contaminated irrigation water and/or 
manure or presence of birds and rodents in storage facili-
ties [70].
Due to the high humidity and the favourable tempera-
ture during sprouting, bacterial pathogens present on 
dry seeds can multiply and result in a public health risk 
[71]. As in production of berries, GHP and control based 
on hazard analysis and critical control point (HACCP) 
principles are crucial to avoid pathogen contamination 
[69, 72]. However, one concern as regards sprouting is 
that seeds are produced for several end-uses (e.g. edible 
seeds, animal feeds, oil production, horticulture) and not 
specifically for sprout production. Thus, the seed grower 
does not necessarily know whether the seed will be sold 
for food use as seeds or sprouts and therefore may have 
little incentive to follow GAPs [69]. Seeds grown for the 
production of sprouts for human consumption should be 
segregated from products intended for other uses [73]. 
Another concern shared with raspberry production is 
that seed processing, shipping and selling practices often 
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involve mixing multiple lots of seeds of different origins, 
complicating traceback and providing an opportunity for 
cross-contamination [69]. Once present on or in seeds, 
pathogenic bacteria are likely to survive for extended 
periods of time [74]. There is so far no bactericidal step 
which is able to completely control contamination of 
seeds with bacterial foodborne pathogens acquired prior 
to germination [70]. However, hot water treatment is 
reported to be effective for disinfecting inoculated STEC 
O157:H7 and Salmonella [75].
As one of the components of a food safety management 
system for sprouted seeds, food safety criteria for Listeria 
monocytogenes and Salmonella were laid down in EU 
Regulation (EC) No. 2073/2005, amended together with 
a process hygiene criterion for E. coli, as a result of EFSA 
opinion recommending strengthened microbiological 
criteria [70]. An additional microbiological criterion on 
sprouted seeds was laid down in which absence of STEC 
(six serogroups, including O104) has to be proven in 25 g 
(n = 5) (EC 2073/2005 with amendments included 2013).
The importance of Listeria monocytogenes in ready‑to‑eat 
foods
There has been an increasing trend in human listeriosis 
since 2008 and in 2015 it was the fifth most frequently 
reported zoonosis in the EU. While still relatively rare 
compared with campylobacteriosis and salmonellosis, 
human listeriosis is the most deadly zoonosis in the EU, 
with a hospitalisation and fatality rate of 90 and 20%, 
respectively, particularly among the elderly population 
[4].
The fact that most listeriosis cases appear to be spo-
radic and that the incubation period can be very long [76] 
makes it difficult to detect links between human cases 
and causative foods [77]. Since L. monocytogenes is ubiq-
uitous in nature, a wide range of foodstuffs can become 
contaminated [77]. Most reported outbreaks within the 
EU have involved processed, refrigerated ready-to-eat 
(RTE) products of animal origin, such as delicatessen 
meats, smoked salmon and soft cheeses [78]. However, 
the list of implicated food categories associated with 
human listeriosis has lengthened significantly during 
recent years. For example, food of plant-derived origin 
(e.g. melon, toffee apple) or even frozen foods (e.g. ice-
cream) have been implicated in outbreaks globally [79], 
illustrating that, under certain unexpected conditions, 
almost all RTE foods may have the potential to contribute 
to the burden of disease. In a source attribution of listeri-
osis in England and Wales, the major source of infection 
was multicomponent foods, for example sandwiches and 
pre-packed mixed salad vegetables [19].
Post-processing cross-contamination from equip-
ment and the environment represents a major concern 
for L. monocytogenes, although the bacterium is inacti-
vated by the thermal treatments used for production of 
some RTE foods [80, 81]. In 2006, new EU food hygiene 
regulations came into force recommending that food 
businesses manufacturing RTE foods should monitor 
processing areas and equipment for the presence of L. 
monocytogenes as part of their sampling schedule (EC No 
2073/2005). The limit for the EU food safety criterion for 
L. monocytogenes is set at 100 CFU/g for RTE products 
on the market. Despite these criteria being applied, the 
presence of L. monocytogenes in RTE foods represents 
one of the major challenges for the food industry.
Listeria monocytogenes can grow at a wide pH range, 
at high salt concentrations and at refrigeration tempera-
ture [82]. The wide growth range and the biofilm-forming 
capacity allows this pathogen to subsist in the food pro-
cessing plant environment, survive various food process-
ing hurdles and proliferate in food products [83]. Listeria 
monocytogenes finds favourable growth conditions on 
floors, in drains and on equipment with harbourage sites 
(i.e. shelters due to unhygienic design) and in unhygienic 
or damaged materials, where strains of L. monocytogenes 
are recurrently found despite cleaning and disinfection 
[84]. For example, a dicing machine can sustain contami-
nation by L. monocytogenes and transfer a specific PFGE 
type for a long time [85]. Even when using hygienically 
designed and well-maintained equipment and with strin-
gent implementation of GMP, total control of L. mono-
cytogenes in RTE food processing plants, including on 
non-food contact surfaces (e.g. drains), is extremely dif-
ficult [84]. The use of modified atmosphere packaging or 
anti-microbial additives, e.g. lactate [86], may prolong the 
shelf-life of refrigerated RTE foods, which may reduce 
food waste. However, it may also allow prolonged growth 
of L. monocytogenes, which is particularly important 
if the product is stored at abuse temperatures [87, 88]. 
Unsafe practices in consumers’ homes are not uncom-
mon, e.g. it has been reported that the mean temperature 
in domestic refrigerators in EU countries ranges from 4 
to 8 °C and the maximum temperature from 10 to 21 °C 
[89], with higher temperatures constituting a higher risk 
of L. monocytogenes growth.
Antimicrobial resistance as a foodborne One 
Health problem
Detection of antimicrobial substances in foodstuffs is a 
rare event, while detection of bacteria with genes for anti-
microbial resistance (AMR) is common. For example in 
Sweden during 2015, around one out of every 5000 sam-
ples taken from domestic food animal production tested 
positive for antimicrobial substances, while in import 
controls antimicrobials were found in one batch out of 
3500 consignments of foodstuffs originating outside the 
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EU. In contrast, monitoring of broilers at slaughterhouses 
in Sweden indicated that, in the period 2010–2016, 
between 25 and 50% of broiler carcasses were contami-
nated with extended spectrum beta-lactamase-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae (ESBL) [90]. Hence the One Health 
concern is foodborne consumer exposure to bacteria 
with genes coding for resistance to specific antibiotics.
Concerns about emerging AMR bacteria have previ-
ously been tempered by the knowledge that development 
of AMR in bacteria imposes a fitness cost [91]. Hence, 
resistant bacteria will initially have lower viability and 
ability to multiply than sensitive bacteria in an environ-
ment free of antimicrobials. The practical implication of 
the fitness cost proposition is that once the use of anti-
microbials ceases, the sensitive bacteria will again prevail 
in competition with the resistant bacteria. As always, the 
picture is more complicated. Already 15 years ago, Zhang 
et al. [92] noted that fluoroquinolone-resistant Campylo-
bacter spp. appeared to have no fitness costs compared 
with non-resistant Campylobacter spp., with the impli-
cation that ending the use of quinolones would have no 
impact on the presence of quinolone-resistant Campylo-
bacter spp. Moreover, it appears that the use of antibiot-
ics is correlated with higher mutation rates, and thereby 
higher likelihood of resistance emerging [93]. These 
mutations may also reduce the fitness costs associated 
with resistance [94].
Detection of bacteria with genes for resistance in food-
stuffs is a concern because foodstuffs are efficient trans-
mission pathways for carrying, and thereafter exposing 
consumers, to bacteria with genes encoding for AMR. 
Consequently, rapid spread of AMR bacteria can be fore-
seen if foodstuffs are contaminated. The AMR genes can 
persist either in commensals, including indicator bac-
teria, or on pathogens, and the genes can be exchanged 
between different species of bacteria along the food chain 
[95].
In an own-initiative opinion on AMR, the biological 
hazards panel of the EFSA [95] noted that resistant Sal-
monella and Campylobacter spp. are foodborne and caus-
ing human disease. For example, poultry meat appears to 
be a major source of Campylobacter spp. with quinolone 
resistance. Implicated foodstuffs for spreading cepha-
losporin resistance are poultry, pork and beef. Hence, 
food production systems must be designed to prevent the 
spread of resistant bacteria to consumers. Moreover, the 
EFSA scientists raised the concern that amongst food-
borne pathogens and commensals, there is an increasing 
and diverse range of resistance to antimicrobial agents of 
human and veterinary importance. They concluded that 
any further spread of resistance among bacteria in foods 
is likely to increase human exposure and consequently 
the risks to public health.
In One Health discussions, AMR is usually ranked 
amongst the top concerns on which the veterinary and 
public health sides need to collaborate. The use of antimi-
crobials in food animals has serious negative externalities 
or side-effects, as it provides an excellent environment 
for the spread and persistence of AMR zoonotic bac-
teria in animal food production systems, resulting in 
antimicrobials used in human medicine becoming less 
useful. Nearly 20 years ago, Aarestrup and Wegner [96] 
noted that modern food animal production requires 
large amounts of antimicrobials and concluded there is 
an urgent need to implement strategies for mitigating 
and controlling AMR. Recently, a more pessimistic view 
was presented by Courvalin [97], who concluded that the 
development of AMR is unavoidable, but could perhaps 
be delayed.
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy and One 
Health challenges
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or “mad cow 
disease” is a member of the group of diseases called 
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) 
affecting the brain and nervous system of humans and 
animals, all caused by abnormal forms of proteins (pri-
ons). BSE is a zoonotic disease in cattle, causing variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans [98, 99]. The 
origin or original source of BSE is unknown, but at the 
end of the 1970s an established cycle of nutrients was 
changed in the rendering process in the UK, thereby ena-
bling circulation and amplification of the BSE agent. The 
changes included feeding cattle and calves with meat-
and-bone meal (MBM) of ruminant origin. The reasons 
for this feeding system based on recycling of nutrients 
included: (a) the need for high-nutrient animal feeds 
to increase yields in dairy production, (b) the quest for 
cheaper feed ingredients with high protein content, (c) 
reducing amounts of animal waste and by-products and 
thereby associated costs, and (d) food security and self-
sufficiency [100]. The rendering process included suffi-
cient heat treatment to ensure that zoonotic and animal 
pathogens such as Salmonella and classical swine fever 
(CSF) virus were killed. However, this treatment was not 
sufficient to inactivate prions.
De Koeijer [101] concluded that one infected cow could 
infect 15–20 other cows on average through the render-
ing, MBM and cow feed cycle, thereby indicating the 
potential of an outbreak emerging. According to the UK 
BSE Inquiry report [102], the first cases in cattle in the 
UK were noted in December 1984, while official recogni-
tion of the new disease as BSE was 2 years later. During 
1987, epidemiological pathological studies were launched 
and these established that ruminant MBM was a risk fac-
tor for BSE, so use of ruminant MBM for feeding cattle 
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was prohibited in 1988 [103]. At this time, BSE became 
notifiable, an eradication policy for cattle showing clini-
cal symptoms was initiated and the question of whether 
BSE was a zoonosis was raised [104]. Studies [105, 106] 
later confirmed that BSE is a zoonosis. In particular, the 
prion protein deposited in the brain of vCJD patients was 
found to be indistinguishable from that of BSE affected 
cattle; the neuropathological changes in macaques inoc-
ulated with BSE were similar to those in vCJD patients; 
and transmission studies in laboratory rodents showed 
that the characteristics of the infectious agent in BSE and 
vCJD were remarkably similar [105, 106]. In 1989, speci-
fied bovine offal (SBO, e.g. brain, spinal cord and eyes, 
but later extended to distal ileum and spleen) was prohib-
ited for human consumption, and petfood manufacturers 
voluntarily ceased the use of SBO [104].
Other measures that were implemented in the 1980s 
included culling of cows showing clinical symptoms and 
destruction of the carcasses, and the removal of specified 
risk material (SRM, formerly SBO) in all cattle. Ducrot 
et al. [107] noted that the number of BSE-infected cows 
decreased for each age cohort born 1988 and thereafter, 
indicating the efficiency of the control measures. On the 
other hand, no measure appeared sufficient to eliminate 
the apparent increase in BSE incidence amongst cows as 
measured by clinical symptoms.
The peak of the epidemic in the UK was observed in 
1992/93, which was around 4  years after the first con-
trol measures were implemented. It thus appeared that 
BSE had an incubation period of four to 6  years [108]. 
This delay in clinical onset of symptoms resulted in other 
EU countries not implementing control measures and 
making the mistake of viewing BSE as a UK-only prob-
lem during 1988–1993. Yet during this period, the rest 
of Europe imported ruminant MBM from the UK as 
a possible ingredient for poultry and pig feed produc-
tion [102, 109]. Moreover, calves and heifers, a number 
of which were most likely infected with the BSE agent, 
were exported from the UK. This was the driver for the 
next wave of BSE in several EU countries [107]. BSE cases 
were subsequently found in Ireland in 1989, in Switzer-
land in 1990, in France in 1991 and in Denmark in 1992 
[110, 111]. National bans on feeding bovine MBM to cat-
tle became implemented more widely in Europe. How-
ever, it was only in 1994 that the EU imposed a general 
ban on feeding mammalian MBM to cattle. This was 
extended in 2001 to a ban on feeding any MBM to any 
food animals in the EU [107]. A BSE geographical risk 
assessment predicted that countries which had imported 
cattle MBM from the UK were at high risk of incubating 
BSE, in particular if their rendering and feeding practices 
enabled the BSE agent (prions) to circulate [112, 113]. 
Thus, for animal diseases with long incubation periods, 
the assumption of disease freedom in a region or country 
is based not only on the absence of clinical disease, but 
also on the absence of exposures or risk factors in periods 
commensurate with the incubation period of that par-
ticular disease [114].
From 1995 to 1997, 21 human cases of vCJD were 
reported [115], nearly all in the UK. From October 1996 
to March 2011, 175 cases of vCJD were reported in the 
UK and 49 cases in other countries [116]. A notewor-
thy feature was the young age at the onset of symptoms, 
as the youngest case was 16  years and median age was 
29  years. Two modelling studies predicted that 200,000 
and 1 million people, respectively, in the UK were incu-
bating vCJD [117, 118]. These modelling results were 
substantiated to some extent 15 years later by Gill et al. 
[119], who studied the prevalence of abnormal prion pro-
tein in the human appendix and found a prevalence of 
one carrier per 2000 people, or around 30,000 carriers in 
total in the UK.
The control and risk management of BSE took place in 
an environment with political disputes—the BSE crisis 
of 1996 [120]. The priority of the EU was to protect con-
sumer confidence in the official control and safety of food 
produced and sold in the EU. In brief, further control 
measures that were seen as draconic, but in retrospect 
necessary, were needed to stop the epidemic by break-
ing the cycle of pathogens in the cattle food and feed 
chain and thereby also protecting the consumer. These 
measures included a total ban on animal MBM in feed 
intended for food animals all over EU, testing at slaughter 
of all cattle older than 30 months for prions and, in the 
UK, the destruction of all cattle above 30 months of age 
and testing of all fallen stock. In some cases whole cat-
tle herds were slaughtered and the carcasses destroyed 
when one BSE case was found, in particular in the early 
days of the epidemic. The most stringent measures 
applied to countries where the geographical risk assess-
ment indicated a high risk of BSE. The control measures 
were efficient, but not sufficient to control and eliminate 
the public health risk and consumer concerns [120]. One 
successful action on the EU level was the development 
of two roadmaps for control of prion diseases, including 
BSE [121, 122].
Conclusions
There are several important lessons to be learnt from the 
cases presented above to illustrate One Health and food 
safety challenges in Europe. The cases, caused by differ-
ent combinations of pathogens/food commodities, are 
examples of the importance of having sufficient knowl-
edge of the incidence and burden of foodborne diseases 
within Europe. This is particularly true for the non-
zoonotic foodborne diseases that are not included in any 
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EU reporting. Food safety resources need to be allocated 
where they result in the largest One Health benefits and 
risk reductions and these can be prioritised using a com-
bination of different measures on health risks. The One 
Health challenges include developing similar measurable 
metrics for animal health and welfare and environmental 
health that enable comparisons. Currently, this has to be 
solved on a case-by case basis.
It can also be discussed whether a risk-based or a 
hazard-based approach to control foodborne infec-
tions should be used. From a public health perspective, 
it might be tempting to focus on specific hazards, but 
the greatest health benefits will be achieved if a risk-
based approach is used. One example of a hazard-based 
approach is the focus on controlling Salmonella in food-
stuffs. This has generally been successful, but it has not 
necessarily improved the food safety situation, as Campy-
lobacter spp. infections have been the most common 
foodborne zoonosis in recent years. The examples pre-
sented in this paper show that control in primary produc-
tion and processing is crucial for reducing the occurrence 
of pathogens in the food web. The current increase in 
consumption of raw or minimally processed food com-
modities poses extra challenges for products requiring a 
high level of manual handling.
From the case describing AMR, it can be concluded 
that the best strategy is to delay and if possible prevent 
the emergence and subsequent dissemination of resist-
ant bacteria or resistance genes. Consequently, liberal 
use of antimicrobial substances in veterinary medicine 
to treat food and companion animals is not sustainable 
in the long run. Thus antimicrobial drugs must not be 
used to compensate for substandard rearing facilities 
and animal welfare. Instead, preventative medicine must 
be improved, including better biosecurity and reinforce-
ment of animal health and welfare within production 
systems, and there must be better access to vaccines to 
protect against infections and more animal breeding pro-
grammes aimed at robustness and resilience.
The BSE case illustrates the importance of including a 
One Health perspective at an early stage in an outbreak 
or when controlling foodborne diseases, and also when 
designing circular food systems. For example, the abil-
ity to spread and the magnitude and severity of the BSE 
epidemic was only fully grasped when the One Health 
approach was applied. The One Health approach revealed 
that important aspects of the BSE epidemic, such as food 
safety, public health and the ability of the BSE agent to 
spread through the food and feed chains, were over-
looked. Hence in retrospect and regret, one could con-
clude that timely preventive and prophylactic measures 
were not implemented, thus enabling the spread of BSE 
all over Europe and greater exposure of consumers.
All this is a part of the larger challenge of feeding 11 
billion people with safe and wholesome food without 
enlarging the environmental footprint of food production 
and consumption. We foresee that this challenge will test 
food security and safety systems to their limits and some-
times beyond. The key will be to find working solutions 
that consider several competing aims, in other words 
the overall best solutions. Moreover, food safety, nutri-
tion and security are complementary and not competing 
aims, and must be pursued simultaneously.
Future achievements in food safety, public health 
and welfare within Europe will largely depend on how 
well politicians, researchers, industry, national agen-
cies and other stakeholders manage to collaborate. This 
review shows that there is a high degree of complexity in 
the food web. Without close One Health collaboration 
between all parties, it will be difficult to solve the chal-
lenges of tomorrow and find the best solutions.
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